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The Public Health Tesseract: Managing the
Multiplicative Threat
Asha M. George ∗
The public health community tends to manage population
health issues separately.
For example, we separate
bioterrorism from antibiotic-resistant tuberculosis from obesity
from influenza, and so on. Understandably, this has occurred
because the requirements for dealing with each of the many
different public health issues can be complicated and unique.
To simplify the complexities, we have pulled apart the tangled
strands of health-related challenges in an effort to identify and
deal with them individually. However, we often neglect the
reality that we have to deal not only with the individual
strands but with the problems their interactions and the entire
tangle present, as well. The threats to public health are
multiplicative. We must take both measured and
multidimensional approaches to address them.
Public health management left the second and third
dimensions behind long ago and should now be modeled upon
the four-dimensional tesseract. The tesseract is based on the
four-dimensional analog of the cube, with eight cubicle cells,
twenty-four faces, thirty-two edges, and sixteen vertices
(Figure 1). 1
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FIGURE 1. TESSERACT

Figure 1. Tesseract
With its eight cubicle cells, the tesseract better shapes our
thinking and actions, and more accurately represents the
challenges presented by population health issues. Each of the
seven individual cells of the tesseract represents an issue that
is often otherwise inappropriately addressed in isolation. The
eighth cell represents the whole tesseract, symbolizing the
entirety of what must be held in the leader’s mind when
making decisions. This four-dimensional construct embodies
the totality of the problem and its individual parts, thus
leading to better results. The combined threat of pandemic
influenza (naturally-occurring) and bioterrorism (humangenerated) can be used to illustrate and support the use of this
model.
THE FIRST CELL: ANTICIPATION OF PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA
Experts consider an influenza pandemic long overdue. 2 A
pandemic could occur via a number of mechanisms, including:
sustained and efficient human-to-human transmission of avian
influenza, 3 the rise of novel strains of the virus, antigenic shift
2. Maggie Fox, Flu Pandemic Could Kill Half Million in US, Reuters,
June 24, 2005.
3. See id.; see also Alison Abbott, Chicken Flu Races Through Dutch
Poultry Farms, 422 NATURE 247 (2003); Andrej Trampuz et al., Avian
Influenza: A New Pandemic Threat?, 79 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 523, 523-530
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in the virus, 4 genetic reassortment or recombination of human
influenza with another strain, 5 the intentional release of a
strain known to be extremely virulent in today’s populations or
genetically engineered to cause a pandemic, 6 or the accidental
release of a strain from a laboratory. 7 Given current levels of
U.S. preparedness and health, an influenza pandemic could
cause 500,000 to die and more than two million to become
severely ill. Additionally, more than seven million might die
worldwide. 8 Further, it is expected that pandemic influenza
will affect the entire age spectrum, including young adults. 9
Thus, the first cell of the tesseract addresses the anticipation of
a pandemic caused by influenza as it relates to preparedness,
detection, and response requirements.
THE SECOND CELL: PANDEMIC INFLUENZA AS A
TERRORISM MULTIPLIER
An enemy could take advantage of the next influenza
pandemic by applying force-multiplier theory 10 (where one
seeks to multiply the force of an attack by combining effects,
building upon pre-existing conditions, etc.) in the terrorism
context. For example, naturally-occurring or human-generated
biological or non-biological agents could be released while a
pandemic is already underway. Even though it may take
decades for a pandemic causing influenza virus to occur
naturally, some cultures may be willing to wait, in order to
(2004); World Health Organization, Avian Influenza A(H5N1) – Situation
(Poultry) in Asia as of 2 March 2004: Need for a Long-Term Response,
Comparison with Previous Outbreaks, 10 WKLY. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REP. 96,
96-100 (2004).
4. See Nancy J. Cox et al., Influenza Pandemic Planning, 21 VACCINE
1801, 1801-03 (2003).
5. See Robert B. Belshe, The Origins of Pandemic Influenza – Lessons
from the 1918 Virus, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2209, 2209-11 (2005); see also
Graeme Laver & Elspeth Garman, Pandemic Influenza: Its Origin and
Control, 4 MICROBES & INFECTION 1309, 1309-1316 (2002).
6. See Kathleen F. Gensheimer et al., Influenza Pandemic Preparedness,
9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1645, (2003); see also Mohammad Madjid
et al., Influenza as a Bioweapon, 96 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 345, 345-46 (2003).
7. See Walter R. Dowdle, Influenza Pandemic Periodicity, Virus
Recycling, and the Art of Risk Assessment, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 34, 38 (2006).
8. Fox, supra note 2.
9. See Eve E. Slater, Industry and Government Perspective in Influenza
Control, 31 TEX. HEART INST. J. 42, 42-44 (2004) (noting that the 1918
“Spanish flu” was particularly bad among young adults).
10. EDWARD LUTTWAK, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR 226 (Harper &
Row 1991).
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capitalize on the panic and confusion created by the virus – if
for no other reason than it would take equally long to
manufacture an equally dangerous biological threat. While
countries throughout the world are focused on the pandemic,
their infrastructures (including those related to national
security) would be weakened and strained, making them easy
targets for successful attacks.
An enemy could catalyze a pandemic by collocating birds,
and by preventing adequate
pigs, and humans, 11
communication of health information, including that generated
by surveillance. 12 An enemy could introduce current versions
of the disease in places where public health infrastructures are
known to be weak, in order to draw down global medical
resources. Furthermore, an enemy could seek to destroy
stockpiles, manufacturers, distributors, government agencies,
and laboratories once a pandemic does hit. As a result, an
enemy can increase world disorder and prevent countries and
regions from responding sufficiently to the diseases caused by
influenza and other organisms. 13
The very threat of a pandemic and the resulting research
into vaccines and antiviral therapies designed to combat it,
could benefit potential enemies. 14
Research designed to
develop a vaccine against a pandemic strain could require the
generation of a more virulent strain that could itself be used as
a weapon of mass effect. This would allow an enemy to
acceptably create increasingly virulent and/or bioengineered
strains of influenza, 15 and develop vaccines and antiviral
therapies against them, under the supportive eye of the
worldwide health science establishment. An enemy would not
necessarily share this research but if caught could say it was
trying to validate its results before publishing and otherwise
releasing its findings. The vaccine could then be used to
11. See Michael T. Osterholm, Preparing for the Next Pandemic, 352 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1839, 1841-42 (2005).
12. See Neil M. Ferguson et al., Public Health Risk from the Avian H5N1
Influenza Epidemic, 304 SCIENCE 968, 968-69 (2004).
13. Anne Applebaum, Op-Ed., Only a Game?, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2005,
at A19 (discussing the break-down that occurred from a simulated smallpox
attack in a simulated war game called Atlantic Storm).
14. See Tony DeCrappeo, Biosecurity and Dual-Use Research, 36 NAT’L
COUNCIL U. RES. ADMIN. NEWSL., July/Aug. 2004, at 2 (noting that new
security controls on who can work with “select agents” have decreased the
number of people working on treatments for highly virulent diseases).
15. Slater, supra note 9, at 44.
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protect the enemy population or a subgroup while the disease is
released and a pandemic ensues.
Should an enemy decide to incorporate pandemic influenza
into its plans to wage war or terrorism against other nations,
information regarding the disease and the state of readiness of
other countries could easily be gathered. This information is
readily available on the Internet. In addition, an enemy could
hide behind the nobility of seeking to improve the public health
of their own nation, region, or even the world, to obtain
additional information that is not available on the Internet. It
would not take much time or research to ascertain the
pervasive lack of preparedness throughout the world, however.
This lack is evidenced by the dearth of national pandemic
preparedness planning; 16 mounting difficulties with currentday influenza vaccine development, production, and
distribution; 17 and increasingly flimsy public health
infrastructures. 18 Even when significant efforts have been
taken to plan for pandemic influenza (such as the
Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic
Influenza 19 ), activities required to operationalize those plans
have not occurred pervasively. This second cell of the tesseract
addresses the use of a pandemic to multiply the ill-effects of a
terrorist event as it relates to prevention, preparedness,
detection, response, and recovery.
THE THIRD CELL: PREPAREDNESS PLANNING
Lack of pandemic influenza preparedness plans is a clear
indicator of national vulnerability, if only because draft plans
are not funded or otherwise provided the resources required to
execute the activities they incorporate. Parts of a draft plan
could certainly be adopted for use if a pandemic were to occur
before the plan was finalized. However, this necessarily
renders disease prevention and preparedness secondary. An
enemy can accurately assume that if a plan is still in draft,
then the authoring country faced with a pandemic will only
respond to a pandemic if it occurs, and will not be truly
prepared for it ahead of time. Therefore, that country is
vulnerable to the disease as well as the approaching
16.
17.
18.
19.

See generally Osterholm, supra note 11, at 1839-42.
Applebaum, supra note 13.
Trampuz, supra note 3, at 523-27.
HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2006).
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pandemic. 20 Compounding the problem, many nations are
waiting for industrialized countries to complete their planning
so they can see what works before developing and
implementing their own plans. This third cell of the tesseract
addresses planning as an indicator of national vulnerability as
it relates to preparedness, response, and recovery.
THE FOURTH CELL: VACCINE DEVELOPMENT
Vaccine manufacturers have faced increasing difficulties
Such
with current influenza vaccine development. 21
difficulties are not surprising. The same basic egg-based
procedures have been used to develop these vaccines for
decades. While these methods have been improved upon, it
still takes months to develop a new vaccine, regardless of how
well it actually prevents disease once produced and delivered. 22
Further, we still guess about which components for new
strains of the influenza virus will combine in the future.
Although this speculation is certainly informed, there is no
reason to expect that it will always be correct or that the
predictions will hit the mark completely. 23 Should they turn
out to be incorrect, vaccines for the correct strain would need to
be developed after the expression of the virus, further delaying
delivery to populations throughout the world. 24 Lastly, as with
vaccines for organisms that could be used for bioterrorism,
vaccine manufacturing companies find influenza vaccine
development to be a difficult business enterprise. Without an
outbreak of the disease to increase the demand for vaccine, it is
hard to make an effective business case for engaging in
development of a new vaccine. This becomes harder as time
goes by and vaccines fail to be produced. 25 Possible solutions
include government-run programs that encourage companies to
develop vaccines by providing grants. 26 However, participation
20. World Health Organization, supra note 3, at 98-99.
21. Applebaum, supra note 13.
22. Erica Seiguer, Protecting the Nation’s Health: Ensuring a Stable
Supply of Influenza Vaccine, COMMONWEALTH FUND, July 2005, at 1.
23. See id.
24. See Slater, supra note 9, at 43 (noting that under optimal conditions,
it will take nine to twelve months to prepare adequate vaccine to fight a
pandemic); see also Trampuz, supra note 3, at 528-29.
25. See David Brown, How US Got Down to Two Makers of Flu Vaccine,
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at A01 (stating that even under the best
circumstances, vaccines have never been very attractive investments).
26. See id.
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in such grant programs is not lucrative. Some money being
better than none is not particularly motivational in the
business context. Thus, this fourth cell of the tesseract
addresses vaccine development issues as they relate to disease
prevention.
THE FIFTH CELL: PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE
Public health infrastructures throughout the world have
experienced erosion and decline for decades. Prevention and
preparedness are often sacrificed in efforts to contain health
care costs or to pay for other health programs that address
more urgent real-time needs. 27 Countries make public health
reinvestments sporadically, often after a disease thought to be
close to eradication reappears and/or has mutated into
something worse (for example, those diseases caused by
antibiotic resistant organisms, such as tuberculosis). 28
Although many consider the public health infrastructures of
third world countries to be inadequate, such countries may very
well find themselves in better stead when it comes to dealing
with pandemic influenza because they focus many of their
public health efforts on combating epidemics from other
diseases on an ongoing basis. 29 However, localized disease
outbreaks could overwhelm any country’s public health
infrastructure, 30 and pandemic influenza could overwhelm the
public health infrastructure in every country around the world.
This fifth cell of the tesseract addresses public health
infrastructure as it relates to disease prevention, deterrence,
preparedness, detection, response, recovery, and mitigation.

27. See COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH DIV. OF
HEALTH CARE SERVS INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 70,
(National Academy Press 1997) (1988) (noting that new health concerns such
as AIDS, Alzheimer’s disease, alcoholism, and others).
28. See Andrew C. Hayward & Richard J. Coker, Could a Tuberculosis
Epidemic Occur in London as it did in New York?, 6 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 12, 15 (2000) (stating that London needs to learn from the New York
tuberculosis epidemic and take prompt action to improve control by developing
solutions based on the local epidemiology of the disease).
29. See WORLD MED. ASS’N, WMA DECLARATION OF WASHINGTON ON
BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS
1
(2003),
available
at
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b1.htm
(discussing
how
health
systems
worldwide are currently struggling to meet the demands created by resistant
organisms, civil strife, unclean urban environments, and aging populations).
30. See id.
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THE SIXTH CELL: INFORMATION COLLECTION
PRIORITIES
Countries can identify potential enemies (who may use
easily available information regarding pandemic influenza to
attack others) by tracking what sort of information is being
generated and collected, and by whom. For example, influenza
vaccine and antiviral research and development, such as that
regarding cell-culture-based vaccines 31 can be monitored. 32
Having identified these research and development programs,
contributions to the scientific body of knowledge regarding
influenza can also be monitored at conferences and in journals.
The difference between what is discussed regarding influenza
and what is produced regarding other diseases could be
obvious.
Information gathered through surveillance mechanisms
regarding the rates of influenza already occurring in various
parts of the world can also be evaluated for anomalies relative
to the rates within individual countries and regions. 33 If rates
suddenly decline and stay low as compared to other areas, yet
no explanations have been published or otherwise articulated,
these rates could be indicators of the development of a
successful vaccine that protects the enemy’s population better
than that of other countries. 34
Furthermore, we must be prepared to deal with the impact
and aftermath of a pandemic for up to two years. 35 A pandemic
would interrupt normal social processes, including:
communication, transportation, and diplomacy, diminishing
and/or possibly destroying cultures. 36 Social disorder, chaos,
31. See Osterholm, supra note 11, at 1840; Slater, supra note 9, at 43.
32. Cf. Ferguson, supra note 12, at 968 (stating that the World Health
Organization Global Influenza Network’s major focus is to compile information
for influenza vaccine formulation, based on the analysis of viral isolates).
33. Id. at 968 (presenting a method to detect increases in viral
transmissibility based on examination of clusters of human cases). Cf. Johan
Walden & Edward H. Kaplan, Estimating Time and Size of Bioterror Attack,
10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1202, 1202–04 (2004) (discussing a
method for determining the number of people who will be symptomatic and
require medical attention after the attack).
34. Cf. Walden & Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1202 (discussing how an
outbreak forecast could assist in determining the response effort required).
35. See Osterholm, supra note 11, at 1840.
36. See Danuta Skowronski, The High Impact of an Influenza Pandemic,
170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 768, 768 (2004) (describing the estimated number of
Canadians who would be affected by a pandemic of influenza).
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and anarchy could ensue, resulting in reduced security
throughout the United States and the world. The need for
information will increase, but the ability of organizations to
collect and analyze that information will be curtailed. 37 How
will the United States distribute medications and deliver
medical aid to stranded personnel worldwide? How will
information continue to be collected and sent back to the
United States in this context? What is the plan for dealing
with the perception that Americans have access to medication
(just because they are American) that they are not sharing?
How will our embassies, consulates, and other offices be
protected if our security forces are depleted? All of these
questions relate directly to the health of the groups of people
involved. Therefore, it is the shared responsibility of the public
health and intelligence communities (as well as the broader
government, military, and public) to answer these questions.
There is also a growing need to fill the information and
intelligence void when it comes to disease. There is much more
to health-related intelligence than the science of identification,
determining the impact of disease on foreign dignitaries, and
tracking disease patterns. 38 It is important to understand how
a country or region handles disease, as well as how the sick are
viewed (and in a pandemic, how they are treated – ostracized
and possibly mishandled). The comprehensiveness of extant
infrastructures needs to be quantified and judged by evaluating
the level of medical science and technology, how well
indications are identified, how early warning is provided, and
whether medical facilities are present, functioning, and wellequipped, to name a few examples. 39 Additionally, there are
real differences between countries, particularly in how they
handle or wish to handle issues such as quarantine. 40
37. Cf. DENIS C. KAUFMAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, MEDICAL
INTELLIGENCE: A THEATER ENGAGEMENT TOOL, 22–24 (2001) (stating that
there are not enough medical intelligence analysts).
38. See id. at 1–3 (“Medical intelligence, which informs the preventative
medicine process, identifies medical threats to U.S. forces, but also assesses
medical trends, organizations, and related events that affect foreign
populations, and that may impact—directly or indirectly—U.S. policies and
interests.”).
39. See id. at 9–11.
40. Mary Ann Benitez, Hong Kong’s Health Policies Focus on Containing
Avian Influenza, 361 LANCET 318, 318 (2003) (stating that Hong Kong’s
strategy includes active surveillance and improved hygiene in markets and on
farms); Caroline Brown, et. al., Avian Influenza: Current Situation in
Southeast Asia and Impact on Europe, 10 EUROSURVEILLANCE WEEKLY, Jan.
20, 2005, at 1, 1-10, http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ew/2005/050120.asp
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Prioritization and diversion of limited resources will come into
play in ways unique to each country. This broad spectrum of
issues cannot be fully addressed by the intelligence or
Most members of these
diplomatic communities alone. 41
communities do not possess the understanding of public health
necessary to comprehend and apply the information gathered.
This sixth cell of the tesseract addresses health-related
intelligence collection requirements as they relate to
prevention, preparedness, and attribution.
THE SEVENTH CELL: INFORMATION ANALYSIS
Considering the lack of attention and priority the U.S.
public health community garners, it would be absurd to
delegate the entirety of this information analysis requirement
to public health professionals while the intelligence and other
communities focus their efforts elsewhere, and vice versa.
However, the public health community is the only community
in a position to combine information from various sources in
order to correctly and comprehensively identify the varied
implications of disease. Years have gone by while various
organizations, agencies, and countries have discussed the
implications of naturally-occurring and human-generated
disease. We need to realize now that there is no other
professional community capable of filling this gap. This
seventh cell of the tesseract addresses information analysis
requirements as they relate to prevention, preparedness,
detection, response, attribution, and mitigation.
THE EIGHTH CELL: MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
The eighth cell of the tesseract is the composite – the entire
grouping of the seven cells. It best represents the mind of the
decision maker as it should be, thinking about different but
significant aspects of individually important and related public
health issues and problems.
(noting that the Vietnamese government attempts to control outbreaks by
culling infected birds, preventing transport of poultry to and from infected
areas, controlling the slaughter and transport of poultry, and temporarily
stopping imports of fowl and fowl products from neighboring countries);
Trampuz, supra note 3, at 528-29 (stating that isolation precautions identical
to those recommended for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome should be
implemented and continued for fourteen days).
41. See Applebaum, supra note 13 (stating that security efforts should
also focus on fixing the health care system and sharing vaccines).
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CONCLUSION
As public health professionals, we must entertain the
notion of a tesseract to broaden our thinking and manage the
complex interactions between and among the eight cubicle
cells, sixteen vertices, twenty-four faces, and thirty-two edges.
This is not a case of making way for the public health
community to take a leadership role in dealing with various
threats. The community is already there, and by mission and
for professional and organizational survival, it must use the
assets, resources, organizational acumen, analyses, and
operational expertise that it possesses beyond all others to deal
with the threat. Using the tesseract will enable us to respond
to the threat successfully, by applying our skills broadly, and
addressing the issues and their interactions comprehensively.
Managing the multiplicative threat is our mission and our
calling.

